#Prompt Injection
Articles about Prompt Injection — exploring patterns, best practices, and real-world implementations in production systems.
6 posts tagged with prompt injection. ← All posts
A defender's field guide to the injection and jailbreak techniques a red-teamer probes for — the taxonomy, why each one works, and how to turn it into a re-runnable test suite that maps every passed test to a concrete fix.
A deeper, test-focused look at injection and jailbreak families — direct vs indirect (the RAG/agent threat), role-play, obfuscation, many-shot, multi-turn, cross-lingual — plus a red-team methodology: build a probe suite, mutate, test input and retrieval paths, measure, re-test.
Why the #1 risk on the OWASP LLM Top 10 has no clean fix — the model can't tell your instructions apart from the text it reads — and the defense-in-depth pattern that actually shrinks the blast radius.
The #1 LLM risk: direct vs indirect prompt injection (the latter is the real threat for RAG and agents), jailbreak families, and honestly-rated defense-in-depth — delimiting untrusted data, least-privilege tools, human-in-the-loop, and detection's limits.
Treating the prompt as a real engineering artifact — grounded in how a next-token predictor actually works — with roles, specificity, few-shot examples, decomposition, chain-of-thought, grounding, temperature, injection defense, and versioned Go templates you can test.
Prompt engineering as a real engineering discipline: roles, specificity, few-shot, decomposition, chain-of-thought and its cost, grounding, and prompt injection — plus building prompts as versioned, testable Go text/template templates you treat like code.
Prompt injection can hijack what a model says, but not what it's allowed to do — as long as policy lives in a middleware pipeline the model never sees.
A system prompt saying never delete records is a suggestion the model can be talked out of. A gateway that returns FORBID for the delete tool cannot. Put enforcement where the model can't reach it and prompt injection stops mattering for access control.
Lesson 1 of Harness Engineering in Go — why the input guardrail is a hard block, not a warning, and how a plain `net/http` handler wraps the model call so it tests without a running server.
Lesson 1: why the input guardrail is a hard block rather than flag-and-pass, why it counts runes instead of bytes, and how a plain net/http handler wraps the (stubbed) model call so it tests with httptest.
This lesson teaches how deterministic function executors and agent-backed executors compose in one graph with the same `AddEdge` wiring.
One workflow that mixes deterministic executors with two Foundry agent nodes for jailbreak detection and response, joined by the same AddEdge wiring and TurnToken triggering.
All posts on this site are written by Pratik Dhanave, an Agentic AI Architect with 7+ years building production distributed systems, multi-agent AI platforms, and cloud-native infrastructure. About the author → Each article includes working code, architecture diagrams, and references to the specific frameworks and standards discussed. Browse all posts or explore related topics using the tag cloud above.